Obviously the Nazi party's charisma, solidarity, and nationalism was very attractive to German citizens. But were those reasons enough to persuade a nation to commit genocide? It seems although Nazi measures such as the Nuremberg Laws and boycotts of Jewish-owned businesses were significant in they clearly targeted the race, the strongest force behind the condemnation and oppression of the Jews was the German public.
My argument of this comes from Bernward Dorner's study of denunciations. Of the 481 reports, less than one third were political, a little less than half were in regards to personal considerations, and 114 had no mentioned informant.
The absense of legitimate reason, opinionated justifications, and anonymous informants displays the antisemitism of the German public. No matter how much the Nazis enforced consequences of marriage laws, business boycotts, and star decrees, these policies would not have been as affective if it were not for the support of the public.
The fact Germans were anonymously reporting information regarding Jews to the Gestapo based on personal grievances reveals that citizens were doing away with traditional means of resolving conflicts, and instead relying on coercion.
Something else to consider is the depth of which denuciations were reported to the Gestapo. Informants were from within families, friends, and spouses, but soon they had spread to other Germans as well.
Overall, I believe antisemitism was already a staple of Germany, and, more importantly, was a major factor in the development of Nazi genocide.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
When Compromise Leads to Unbalanced Power
When the Social Democratic Party divided into two subsets, the Majority SPD and the USPD, its communist counterpart, the decisions made would ultimately lead to unequal power. More importantly, this power struggle would lead to a significant occurence that would be an important precoursor to World War II.
The Majority SPD succeeded in establishing an eight-hour work day and make a deal with big businesses to consider free trade rights and unions. They would also choose to accept military support for the revolution in exchange for avoiding any revolutionary changes within the army. Although their deals looked good, this second decision would form an unequal balance of power.
As more and more actions are caused by the military compromise, the communist subset of the SPD would revolt for Marxism. Shortly after, the Majority SPD would use the right-wing military groups on their side to crush the opposing socialists.
The crushing of the Spartacist revolt for full Marxism is a significant turning point in the events leading up to World War II because it shows the emergence of political powers being completely unwilling to cooperate with opposition. Instead, they began using force to exert power, rather than political motions.
On a bigger level, it seems the division of the SPD and the power struggle that would follow left a window open for Nazi control. Just as the Majority SPD would not accept or reason with the other socialists' discontent, the Nazis would not consider compromising to help their opposition, no matter if it consisted of German citizens.
The Majority SPD succeeded in establishing an eight-hour work day and make a deal with big businesses to consider free trade rights and unions. They would also choose to accept military support for the revolution in exchange for avoiding any revolutionary changes within the army. Although their deals looked good, this second decision would form an unequal balance of power.
As more and more actions are caused by the military compromise, the communist subset of the SPD would revolt for Marxism. Shortly after, the Majority SPD would use the right-wing military groups on their side to crush the opposing socialists.
The crushing of the Spartacist revolt for full Marxism is a significant turning point in the events leading up to World War II because it shows the emergence of political powers being completely unwilling to cooperate with opposition. Instead, they began using force to exert power, rather than political motions.
On a bigger level, it seems the division of the SPD and the power struggle that would follow left a window open for Nazi control. Just as the Majority SPD would not accept or reason with the other socialists' discontent, the Nazis would not consider compromising to help their opposition, no matter if it consisted of German citizens.
Saturday, October 3, 2009
A "War for Everyone": The Double-Edged Sword
It is clear one of the biggest factors that contributed to the mobilization of the young nation of Germany was the Great War. Germany's declaration of war against France, Great Britain, and Russia was followed by a surge of nationalism. Never before had such a movement made German citizens comprehend the idea of a nation. Furthermore, both socialists and nationalists felt their political programs were justified by the national war efforts.
As Hitler would put it, "the declaration for war produced a sense of Germaness that filled him with ecstasy." 1914, the year of the monumental gathering in Munich, would become a model for what national mobilization could achieve.
However, towards the end of World War I the hopeful times celebrated by Germany would be a distant memory. Similar to other nations, Germany lost hundreds of thousands of men. But what is more significant is how the mass mobilization of the wartime economy would lead to severe inflation and a major depression, as well as political turmoil between the Left and Right sides of the political spectrum, as well as a food crisis which would cause many individuals to turn to the black market in an effort to avoid giving everything to the army and/or be able to eat feed one's family.
Because of all this, the measure of Germany's political future had now become the citizens, all of the soldiers, workers, and consumers. I feel that although the rapid wartime mobilization caused many problems for both the citizens and monarchy, it led to a realisation as to what the new European power of Germany needs to have.
As Hitler would put it, "the declaration for war produced a sense of Germaness that filled him with ecstasy." 1914, the year of the monumental gathering in Munich, would become a model for what national mobilization could achieve.
However, towards the end of World War I the hopeful times celebrated by Germany would be a distant memory. Similar to other nations, Germany lost hundreds of thousands of men. But what is more significant is how the mass mobilization of the wartime economy would lead to severe inflation and a major depression, as well as political turmoil between the Left and Right sides of the political spectrum, as well as a food crisis which would cause many individuals to turn to the black market in an effort to avoid giving everything to the army and/or be able to eat feed one's family.
Because of all this, the measure of Germany's political future had now become the citizens, all of the soldiers, workers, and consumers. I feel that although the rapid wartime mobilization caused many problems for both the citizens and monarchy, it led to a realisation as to what the new European power of Germany needs to have.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)